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I. INTRODUCTION
I look forward to the publication of HEALTHISM: HEALTH
STATUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (hereinafter Healthism),
by Jessica L. Roberts of the University of Houston Law Center
and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard of the University of Georgia Law
School.
On November 4, 2016, at the invitation of Professors
Roberts and Weeks, I participated in a conference in which the
discussants commented on Roberts and Weeks’ forthcoming book
and shared thoughts about the relevance of that work to various
related fields. What follows here is somewhat different than
those comments—although the general themes are the same—
and is so in part because, four days after the conference, Donald
J. Trump was, contrary to the predictions of virtually all
knowledgeable observers,1 elected the 45th president of the
United States.
As I explain in more detail below, I am concerned that the
Trump Administration will distract scholars from continuing
important work they have begun, and, relatedly, from fully
engaging with the works of other scholars that deserve
attention. Roberts and Weeks’ novel is such a work, and one
that has already, through the process of scholarly engagement,
evolved in promising directions that should continue, even after
the book’s publication. Although I cannot say I agree with every
argument the book makes, I would be incredibly disappointed
and discouraged if this provocative and conversation-starting
book did not receive the attention, praise, and criticism it clearly
deserves merely because the nation elected to its highest office a
person as singularly outlandish and attention-consuming as our
45th president.2
II. HIDDEN DANGERS IN THE AGE OF PRESIDENT TRUMP
The election of Donald J. Trump—and the tumultuous
1. Maya Rhodan & David Johnson, Here are 7 Electoral College Predictions for
Tuesday, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4561625/electoral-college-predictions/
[https://perma.cc/QNY9-3GDM].
2. I do not consider myself particularly political and am not a political expert.
But the election of President Trump was so system-jarring that ignoring it seems a
strange choice. While Donald Trump was not the person I had hoped would become
President, now that he is, I continue to hope that my worst fears about President
Trump will turn out to be wrong, and that he will use his considerable talents to
improve, rather than ruin, our great but imperfect nation.
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beginnings of his Administration—seems to have overshadowed
everything else in the room. Little about his campaign or
conduct gave any of the nearly 66 million citizens who voted for
his opponent3 any confidence that he would act in the interests
of all Americans, or even within the traditional bounds of
presidential propriety.
The first days of the Trump
Administration aggravated, rather than assuaged, those
concerns.
President Trump opened his term with a bizarre falsehood
and tantrum: he lied about the size of his inauguration crowd,
an assertion easily disprovable by publicly available
photographs, which the press quickly pointed out.4 President
Trump, infuriated, ordered his then Press Secretary, Sean
Spicer, to conduct an impromptu press conference during which
Spicer (1) took no questions, (2) berated the press for reporting
the truth, and (3) repeated the demonstrably falsity about crowd
size in response to the press’s coverage.5 Still unhappy about his
popular vote defeat, President Trump also continued to insist
that the three to five million votes cast for Hillary Clinton to win
her the majority were fraudulent or otherwise illegal, an
assertion that is completely unsubstantiated and for which there
is no colorable evidence.6 A few days later, President Trump
insulted the Mexican administration enough that the Mexican
president, Enrique Peña Nieto, cancelled a previously planned
3. President Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes, a fact
which has prompted him “to falsely claim that millions of unauthorized immigrants
had robbed him of a popular vote majority.” Michael D. Shear & Emmarie
Huetteman, Trump Repeats Lie About Popular Vote in Meeting With Lawmakers,
N.Y. TIMES, A1 (Jan. 24, 2017).
4. Elle Hunt, Trump’s Inauguration Crowd: Sean Spicer’s Claims Versus the Evidence, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jan/22/trump-inauguration-crowd-sean-spicers-claims-versus-the-evidence
[https://perma.cc/5LS9-KCRF].
5. Id. See also Chris Cilliza, Sean Spicer Held a Press Conference. He Didn’t
Take Questions. Or Tell The Whole Truth, WASH. POST, (Jan. 21, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/21/sean-spicer-held-apress-conference-he-didnt-take-questions-or-tell-the-whole-truth
[https://perma.cc/
B633-5P67] (describing the conference and Spicer’s refusal to take questions). Of
course, President Trump’s general obsession with size is well-known. As a
candidate, he bristled at sniggering remarks about his small hands, which urban
legend holds is a proxy for the size of a man’s genitals. Stung by a primary rival’s
joke about his hands (and thus his penis), Trump felt compelled to “guarantee” the
audience, in a nationally televised presidential debate, that he there was “no
problem” with the size of his sexual organ. Gregory Krieg, Donald Trump Defends
Size of His Penis, CNN (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/politics
/donald-trump-small-hands-marco-rubio/ [https://perma.cc/N8VV-HD7M].
6. See Shear & Huetteman, supra note 3.
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trip,7 shouted at and hung up on the Prime Minister of
Australia,8 and appeared to express the belief that Frederick
Douglass—the former slave and abolitionist titan who died in
1895—was still alive.9
While the president spoke favorably of Mr. Douglass,10 his
solicitude for activism did not extend to today’s protesters, who
the president referred to as “[p]rofessional anarchists, thugs[,]
and paid protesters.”11 In addition to virtually every other thing
that President Trump has done, including alleged housing
discrimination in the 1970s12 and disparaging civil rights hero
John Lewis,13 his recent actions suggest that Douglass, were he
alive, would not welcome the President’s endorsement. Nor is
the President’s assertion that the protesters are paid true.14
Rather, it is a canard invented and promoted by various fringe
sites.15
The new President’s actions were, for many, even more
discouraging than his words. Most infamously, President Trump
7. Daniella Diaz, Mexican President Cancels Meeting with Trump, CNN (Jan. 27,
2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/mexico-president-donald-trumpenrique-pena-nieto-border-wall/ [https://perma.cc/B4Z6-EHJY].
8. Joe Tacopino, Trump Blasted Australian Prime Minister During ‘Worst Call
By Far’, N.Y. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), http://nypost.com/2017/02/01/trump-blastedaustralian-prime-minister-during-worst-call-by-far/ [https://perma.cc/3EEK-8888].
9. Question of the Day: Does Trump Think Frederick Douglass is Still Alive?,
PASTE MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2017) https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/
2017/02/question-of-the-day-does-trump-think-frederick-dou.html [https://perma.cc/
S4Z7-J6NY].
10. Id.
11. @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:48 AM) https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/827483841589891073 [https://perma.cc/BN2P-3BDU].
12. In 1973, the Justice Department sued Donald Trump for violating the Fair
Housing Act in connection with Trump’s refusing to rent dwellings and negotiate for
the rental of dwellings with persons because of race and color. Michael Kranish and
Robert O’Harrow Jr., Inside the Government’s Racial Bias Case Against Donald
Trump’s Company, and How He Fought It, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-governments-racial-bias-caseagainst-donald-trumps-company-and-how-he-fought-it/2016/01/23/fb90163e-bfbe11e5-bcda-62a36b394160_story.html [https://perma.cc/S6HX-684E]. Donald Trump
settled the case without an admission of guilt. Id.
13. Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., In Feud With John Lewis, Donald Trump Attacked
‘One of the Most Respected People in America’, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/15/in-feud-with-john-lewisdonald-trump-attacked-one-of-the-most-respected-people-in-america/
[https://perma.cc/T8TV-KDNV].
14. Dan
Evon,
Demand
Protest,
SNOPES
(Jan.
18,
2017),
http://www.snopes.com/paid-protesters-donald-trumps-inauguration/
[https://perma.cc/8YLD-FBGG].
15. Id.
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issued an executive order targeting immigrants from seven
Muslim-majority nations16 that (1) apparently resulted from a
phone call to former New York City mayor Rudy Guiliani about
how the Trump Administration might implement a “Muslim
Ban,”17 (2) led to his acting Attorney General refusing to enforce
it,18 (3) resulted in spontaneous nationwide protests,19 (4)
inexplicably barred green-card holders from entering the United
States,20 and (5) resulted in the one-hour detention of the former
Prime Minister of Norway because he had visited Iran, one of
the banned countries.21 The Executive Order was immediately
(and at least temporarily) successfully challenged in Federal
Court,22 after which the President directly attacked the
legitimacy of the judge who enjoined the ban, James L. Robart—
a Republican nominated judge who was unanimously confirmed
by the Senate.23
The above instances are only a sampling of the preposterous
things President Trump did in the first month of his presidency;
it does not even reach policy decisions that are wrong within
16. Exec. Order No.13, 769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry
Into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
17. Amy Wang, Trump Asked For a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says — and Ordered
A Commission to Do It ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-amuslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/
[https://perma.cc/4WDL-P3WH].
18. Jordan Fabian, Trump Fires Acting AG for Refusing to Defend Travel Ban,
THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2017) http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/317018-trumpfires-acting-ag-for-refusing-to-defend-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/2JCV-4ZCK].
19. Emanuella Grinberg & Madison Park, 2nd Day of Protests Over Trump’s
Immigration Policies, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 1:42 AM) http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/29/politics/us-immigration-protests/ [https://perma.cc/ 78W7-WFYW].
20. Dan Merica, How Trump’s Travel Ban Affects Green Card Holders and Dual
Citizens, CNN (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/donald-trumptravel-ban-green-card-dual-citizens/ [https://perma.cc/PUQ6-GAW8].
21. Nadia Khomani, Former Norway PM Held at Washington Airport Over 2014
Visit to Iran, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2017, 8:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2017/feb/03/former-norway-pm-bondevik-held-washington-dulles-airport2014-visit-iran [https://perma.cc/8DS2-M7QU].
22. State of Washington v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Case No. C17-0141JLR, Doc.
52 (W.D. Wash. 2017). The court issued a TRO, which was immediately appealed to
the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals. By the time this essay is published, surely the
case will have been resolved, and the Trump Administration may very well prevail.
23. On Twitter, President Trump “denigrated Judge Robart as a ‘so-called judge’
and described the judge’s order as ‘ridiculous.’” Thomas Fuller, ‘So-Called’ Judge
Criticized by Trump Is Known as a Mainstream Republican, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/james-robart-judge-trump-banseattle.html [https://perma.cc/MR96-LNML]. Robart was nominated by George W.
Bush and confirmed 99-0 by the Senate. Id.
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normal parameters. Bad decisions unaccompanied by a media
frenzy or that do not pose a direct threat to the Republic have
received only modest attention. An early example of this is
President Trump’s delay in implementing a federal regulation
that required financial investment advisors to act in the best
interests of their clients, rather than themselves.24 This rule—
which the Department of Labor (DOL) had worked on for over
six years—was intended to ensure that financial advisors could
not take advantage of their customers.25
It is one that
Democrats and Republicans certainly may, in the normal course,
disagree over. However, the rule affects the management of
trillions of dollars, and given the nation’s use of 401(k) accounts
as the primary mechanism for funding retirement,26 is a rule of
massive long-term consequence.
Nonetheless, the distinct
feeling I get is that the issue has gotten vastly less coverage
than it would have gotten in a “normal” administration, such as,
for example, a Kasich or Rubio administration.
Now, certainly the primary danger is that the President and
his Administration will take actions that will either
permanently damage the country or undermine the rule of law
and democracy itself.27 That is true of any administration, but
the Trump Administration in particular presents the most acute
risk in modern American history. As a result, even the most
somber of observers are right to watch carefully for catastrophe
or creeping autocracy. At present, the saying, “when there is a
fire in the room, the first priority must be ensuring that it does
not burn everything down,” seems particularly relevant.
That said, it would be truly terrible if yet another negative
consequence of “Trumpism” was that careful, difficult, and
nuanced scholarly work might get much less attention than it
would in calmer times. Scholars often have important ideas that
take years, if not decades, before some version of that idea
24. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ON FIDUCIARY DUTY RULE
(Feb.
3,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/
presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule [https://perma.cc/ 9YUQ-NBB5].
25. Kevin Liptak, Trump to take steps rolling back financial regulations, CNN
(Feb. 3, 2017, 2:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/politics/trump-financialexecutive-actions/ [https://perma.cc/FNB8-WZWF].
26. DOL Fiduciary Rule Explained As Of July 5th, 2017, INVESTOPEDIA (July 5,
2017,
10:45
AM),
http://www.investopedia.com/updates/dol-fiduciary-rule/
[https://perma.cc/MAF3-CDSF]
27. David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, THE ATLANTIC (March 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/
513872/ [https://perma.cc/L3D2-EJJA]. Frum is a former speechwriter of President
George W. Bush.
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becomes regularly accepted by the public. Those ideas are less
likely to be ready for mainstream consumption if they have not
been vigorously developed through natural scholarly processes—
which require time, attention, engagement, critique, and
iteration.
Roberts and Weeks’ Healthism is a book that advances and
develops an interesting and subtle idea: that we should be
mindful, in writing and in applying laws, about discriminating
against people based on their health status.28
Not all
discrimination is bad, but clearly some is, and our notions of
justice and optimality will look different if we understand and
internalize that idea. Roberts and Weeks have already evolved
the idea of “healthism” in their respective writings, and it will
continue to evolve as the coming book exposes more individuals
to the core set of principles that animates the theory.29
However, it will only do so if people are free to pay attention and
engage in constructive debate. I hope, in spite of the Trump
Administration, that they do.
III. HEALTHISM AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Health statuses vary amongst people. Sometimes those
with certain health statuses are discriminated against, and such
health discrimination is either justified or it is not.30 Roberts
and Weeks’ theory of “healthism” identifies health
discrimination as a commonly occurring practice throughout
modern society and modern law (including, in reference to
employment, insurance, health-care access, reproductive
technology, and the judicial system).31 Beyond cataloguing its
pervasiveness, Roberts and Weeks offer an approach for
determining when health status discrimination is undesirable,32
such as when it results in a systematic, normative wrong.33
Determining what types of health discrimination result in

28. JESSICA ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (Cambridge U. Press, forthcoming 2017).
29. See Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment
Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571 (2014); Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 850 (2016).
30. Julianne Cheek, Healthism: A New Conservatism?, 18 QUALITATIVE HEALTH
RESEARCH 974, 974 (2008).
31. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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normative wrongs and what types do not is,34 as Roberts and
Weeks acknowledge, a challenging task and one that will
continue to evolve.35 In fact, Roberts and Weeks readily concede
that some health discrimination is salutary.36
Whatever
the
conceptual
challenges
of
defining
unambiguously and comprehensively the elements of
undesirable healthism, Roberts and Weeks’ book shows how
pervasive health discrimination is generally,37 how frequently
health discrimination leads to normative wrongs,38 and how
much of the latter conduct nonetheless escapes legal sanction.39
Put slightly differently, if we imagine health discrimination as
either justified or unjustified, for far too long people have
assumed that the former category dwarfs the latter. Roberts
and Weeks upend this assumption and propose how the law
might respond.40
The classic example of healthism, advanced by Roberts
several years ago, is obesity.41 Obesity is a health status that
“tends to correlate with poor health” and may affect an
employer’s group premium or a worker’s productivity.42 Yet
permitting employers to discriminate on the basis of obesity in
connection with employment decisions is likely to have
meaningful undesirable consequences, such as disparately
impacting already disadvantaged groups, perpetuating existing
socioeconomic health disparities, and contributing to social
stigmas directed at heavier people.43
Roberts and Weeks point out in their book that people who
have medical conditions, such as diabetes, that highly correlate
with, and sometimes are the result of obesity,44 are protected by
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).45 A disability is a
mental or physical impairment that must substantially limit the
ability to perform one major life activity.46 Diabetes qualifies,
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See generally Roberts, supra note 29.
42. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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and thus, one cannot refuse to hire or fire a person merely
because they have diabetes.47 Being obese, however, is generally
not protected under the ADA because “courts have been
reluctant to hold that obesity meets the legal definition of
disability.”48 In turn, this leads to an odd result: an individual
can be fired for having a pre-condition, like obesity, that could,
but has not yet, lead to a disability like diabetes, however, one
cannot be fired once the disability has manifested itself.49
While there are other ways to explain this curious result,
Roberts and Weeks’ work reminds us that we should not be so
quick to accept the consequences without scrutiny.50 There is
demonstrable judicial reluctance to interpret the ADA and other
federal statutes to protect against obesity—either by refusing to
categorize it as a disability or otherwise.51 This may be because
few have thought carefully about the presumption that obesity
or another health status is a “bad” characteristic that does not
deserve protection unless it is conjoined with some other
characteristic the law already protects.52 The contrary notion,
that health status alone should deserve protection unless there
is a very good reason not to protect it against discriminatory
conduct,53 is a keen insight and one that, while not persuasive in
every instance, has opened up fertile ground for scholars and
reformers to engage and debate for social and legal reform.54
One of my own areas of expertise is employee benefits, and
Roberts and Weeks’ work shares important commonalities that
intersect with both benefit scholarship and the themes that
animate reform discussions therein.55 The field of employee
benefits is not particularly accessible to outsiders.56
The
technicalities and jargon particular in the field are described
below.
The central statute in the world of employee benefits is the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).57
47. See Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 858-59.
48. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.
49. Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 852.
50. Roberts, supra note 29, at 594.
51. See Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 858-59.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 861-62.
54. Id. at 855-59.
55. Id. at 844.
56. Id. at 906-07.
57. Health
Plans
&
Benefits:
ERISA,
U.S.
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa

DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
[https://perma.cc/Y6BB-6CCA]
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The enduring perspicacity of Greek myths, which continue to
offer insight almost three millennia after they were first uttered
by itinerant storytellers seeking hot meals on a breezy
archipelago, draw on similar parallels as ERISA. Apposite are
the Gorgons, who were terrifying creatures feared by all sensible
persons.58 Medusa, the most famous Gorgon, was particularly
fearsome.59 She was part snake and part human, and had
poisonous blood and a gaze that could petrify those who dared
stare upon her.60 ERISA has a similar terrifying reputation.61
Most avoid the law because there are significant casualties, and
the successful ones try not to directly contemplate its depth.62
Our engagement here will be mercifully brief.
ERISA was enacted because of Congressional concern about
something other than health insurance—pensions.63 Indeed,
Congress spent years studying the failures of the private pension
system and considered ERISA to primarily be a “pension bill of
rights.”64 That said, while pensions were the primary focus of its
attention, the statute was written to be all-encompassing in two
important ways.
First, ERISA covers all manners of employee benefits.65
(last visited May 2, 2017).
58. Medusa in Myth and Literary History, MOD. AM. POETRY,
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/poets/a_f/bogan/medusamyth.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q2L6-P9BN] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Once an ERISA Plan, Always an ERISA Plan?, AM. B. ASS’N SEC. OF LAB. &
EMP. L., http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ ebc_news
letter/14_sum_ebc_news/erisa.html [https://perma.cc/JH8C-BMK8] (last visited Feb.
27, 2017).
62. As I never tire of telling my students or the unlucky few who read my
articles, ERISA is so boring that it contributed to Justice Souter’s decision to retire
from the Supreme Court. Jess Bravin & Greg Hitt, Justice Souter to Retire from
Court, WALL STREET J. (May 1, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB124114676548376235 [https://perma.cc/22RZ-P9M7] (noting that one Justice
Souter preferred retirement over having to adjudicate “numbingly technical cases
involving applications of pension or benefits law”). Roberts and Leonard thus
cheekily, but rightly, describe ERISA as “striking fear in the hearts of lawyers and
putting judges to sleep for over forty years.” ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.
63. History
of
EBSA
and
ERISA,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa
[https://perma.cc/YG6H-N9C5] (last visited May 2, 2017).
64. 120 Cong. Rec. S1537, S15743 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits); Dana M.
Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA’s Noninterference Provision, 36 BOS. C. L. REV. 201,
231-33 (1995).
65. Patrick Purcell & Jennifer Staman, CRS Report for Congress: Summary of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), CONG. RES. SERV. (April 10,
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Benefits are simply a form of deferred compensation the
employer promises the employee; the benefit bargain is the deal
the employer and the employee strike concerning the terms of
the benefit.66 In ERISA parlance, all benefit bargains must be
embodied in the form of a “plan,” which is both the sum of
bargain terms and an entity that can sue or be sued.67 Plans are
either pension plans or welfare plans.68 Welfare plans include
all plans that provide, among others, health insurance.69
In contrast to pension plans, which Congress regulated in
great detail, Congress engaged very little in substantive
regulation of welfare plans.70 Thus, while all ERISA plans,
including welfare plans, are subject to important procedural
rules,71 all those managing the plan’s affairs are subject to strict
duties.72 However, the content of welfare plans is largely
unregulated,73 and, like all ERISA plans, no employer is
required to offer a plan at all.74 Congress did not highly regulate
health benefit plans because there did not seem to be a pressing
need to do so in 1974 when ERISA was enacted. That pressing
need arose later, and no one has ever accused Congress of having
great foresight.
Second, ERISA includes one of the broadest preemption
provisions written into a federal statute.75 Although the moving
parts of ERISA preemption have proved challenging in practice,
they can be summarized into a basic structure. As an initial
matter, Congress provided that “any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit

2008), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc822611/m1/1/ [https://perma.
cc/T428-PWBU]).
66. See Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV.
1733, 1742-43 (2011) (explaining the benefit bargain).
67. Purcell & Staman, supra note 65.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2)(A) (2012) (defining pension plans and welfare plans).
69. Welfare plans are those plans “established or is maintained for the purpose
of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship
funds, or prepaid legal services[.]” Id.
70. PETER WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 12-13
(Oxford U. Press 2010).
71. Purcell & Staman, supra note 65.
72. Id.
73. WIEDENBECK, supra note 70, at 12-13.
74. Purcell & Staman¸ supra note 65.
75. Id.
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plan” were preempted.76 That clause is restricted by ERISA’s
savings clause, which exempts state insurance, securities, and
banking laws from preemption protection.77 However, to avoid
states labeling benefit plans as insurers and regulating them
through the savings clause, ERISA includes a “deemer clause,”
which bars states from directly regulating employee benefit
plans.78 In addition to preemption under Section 1144, some
state laws are preempted under conflict preemption, namely,
laws that are incompatible with ERISA or its objectives.79
The result of this unusual statutory confluence—broad
preemption and little content regulation—means the states’
authority to impose salutary content regulation of health
insurance is quite limited.80 While many states used ERISA’s
savings clause to enact mandated benefits laws that applied to
insurance companies that sold policies to plans,81 even that
approach faced a limit. Large plans, and even small plans using
stop-loss insurance, are able to self-insure by promising to pay
employees medical benefits themselves.82
Because of the
“deemer clause,” even state laws cannot regulate such selfinsured plans.83
The healthism consequence is that, with respect to the
provision of benefits, the states’ ability to protect against
discrimination on health-status grounds is profoundly limited.84
The state must find a prohibition against the discrimination
under ERISA itself or under some other federal law.85 While
ERISA does have a section aimed at barring interference with
the attainment of any right one has under an ERISA plan or
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012).
78. Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption under the
Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance,
23 J. LEGIS. 307, 316 (1997).
79. Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (explaining
that even saved laws would fall to ERISA conflict preemption).
80. Morrissey, supra note 78, at 316.
81. Robert S. McDonough, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Provider Laws,
1985 DUKE L. J. 1194, 1216 (1985).
82. Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How
States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275,
289-90 (2013) (explaining self-insurance limit on state power).
83. 29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(A) (2012).
84. O’Neill Institute, Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: An
Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform Options Executive Summary, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 101, 120 (2009).
85. 29 C.F.R. 2590.702(b)(1) (2012).
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ERISA generally,86 that provision has proved difficult for
plaintiffs to obtain relief.87 The general rule is that the alleged
discrimination by the employer must have been taken with the
“specific intent” of interfering with a beneficiary’s ERISA
benefits.88 No relief is available where “the loss of pension
benefits was a mere consequence of, but not a motivating factor
behind, the termination of benefits.”89
Proving an intentional discrimination claim under ERISA is
difficult in practice.
Virtually all such claims depend on
circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct statements, that
courts evaluate under a three-part test set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.90 First, the plaintiff makes a prima
facie case, showing that her discharge was intentional to
interfere with the attainment of benefits.91 In the face of such a
showing, the defendant has the burden of showing there was a
valid, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s dismissal.92 If
the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were merely pre-textual.93 In other words, as the
law of ERISA is currently understood, dismissal for being
overweight is only actionable incidentally because ERISA would
only protect an employee’s health status if it inextricably
connected to an employer’s termination decision. An employer’s
decision to fire someone would have to be motivated by the
desire to deny an employee some or all the benefits the employee
otherwise was entitled to receive.94 Indeed, if being overweight
or some other health status had some arguably negative effect
on productivity or performance, it could serve as grounds for
concluding that Section 510 was not violated. Any effort of
86. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2012).
87. See, e.g., Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 957 (9th Cir. 2016).
88. See, e.g., Barbour v. Dynamics Research Group, 63 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding the relevant question is whether an employment action was taken with
“specific intent” to interfere with benefits); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d
834, 851 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
89. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988).
90. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (This was not an
ERISA case, but the test is used in connection with Section 1140 claims).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Emily Seymour Costin, Interference with Protected Rights, in
ERISA LITIGATION, n. 91 (5th ed. 2014) (eds. Zanglien, Frolic, and Stabile) (citing
cases holding that dismissal for poor performance is legitimate grounds for firing
that does not run afoul of section 1140).
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states to change this would likely be explicitly preempted by
Section 1144 or conflict preempted.
The current law of employee benefits is thus not
particularly welcoming to Roberts and Weeks’ project.
Moreover, given the pitched battles that routinely occur at the
Supreme Court over even the smallest interpretative issue
concerning ERISA,95 as a practical matter, benefit law may be a
latecomer to any healthist revolution. That said, Roberts and
Leonards’ work implicates some more general themes about the
wisdom of employment-based systems—implications that may
not be a necessary consequence of their work. Like much
valuable scholarship, the healthist argument makes more
readily apparent fault lines in thinking in other fields.96
Although Americans are intimately familiar with receiving
important benefits—namely retirement plans and health
insurance97—through
the
workplace,
the
theoretical
underpinnings of employment benefits mechanisms are rarely
discussed explicitly. In recent work, I have explained that
employment benefits mechanisms should be conceived of as a
species of regulatory intervention with identifiable qualities.98 A
95. Since 2004 alone, the Supreme Court has decided seventeen ERISA cases.
See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016); Montanile v. Bd. of
Trustees of Nat. Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016); M & G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015); Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014); Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013);
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010); Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); Kennedy v.
Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009); Metro. Life Ins. v.
Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248
(2008); Beck v. Pace Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96 (2007); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med.
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004);
Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004); and Raymond B. Yates,
M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
96. Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 908.
97. Roughly 150 million and 60 million people receive EB health and retirement
benefits, respectively. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF THE
EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE tbl.2 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/03-15-ACA_and_Insurance_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK5C-599C] (estimating that over 150 million people would receive
EB insurance in 2012); Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan
Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2012, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1
(Nov. 2013), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-13.No392.Particip.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MKL-ETMV] (indicating that there were 61.6 million beneficiaries
of EB retirement benefits in 2012).
98. See generally Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything,
100 MINN. L. REV. 1257 (2016) [hereinafter REBA].
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rough sketch of a portion of that view follows.
Some goods are widely believed to be socially desirable,
which include “those goods for which there is broad agreement
that society is better off if most individuals have or are able to
obtain them.”99 For those goods, prevention of market failures is
of particular concern to the government.100 If, for example, the
market fails to make a sufficient amount of that good available
at an affordable price, fails to produce that good at sufficient
quality, or fails to distribute that good equitably, the
government may consider intervening in the market to make
things right.101 One form of intervention—an employment
benefits intervention—is to regulate, through both regulatory
incentives and prohibitions, labor deals involving the good.102
Importantly, when considering whether an employment
benefits intervention makes sense, an individual must be
mindful of two comparisons: (1) whether it improves the world
relative to no intervention, and (2) whether it improves the
world relative to some other form of intervention.103 Frequently,
employment benefits interventions are defended on the grounds
that they improve the world relative to no intervention,104 and
while that is often true, it avoids the question of whether the
government has a less intrusive alternative.105 Moreover, with
respect to employment benefits interventions, although the force
of the justifications vary depending on the particular good,
certain advantages and disadvantages will recur across goods
and implementing statutes.106 I will discuss two of those
recurring features here: (1) fragility and (2) opacity.
A. Fragility
First, employment benefits systems can be regulatorily
fragile.107 Employers are not generally in the business of
providing benefits,108 although many have started doing so to
99. Examples include “[e]ducation, health care, home mortgages, pensions, and
life insurance.” Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1276-77.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1286.
104. Maher, supra note 98, at 1286.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1287.
107. Id. at 1303-05.
108. Id. at 1261.
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please labor markets and attract or keep valuable workers.
However, the more burdensome or costly it is to provide benefits,
the more likely it is that employers will stop offering that
benefit.109 Regulation more protective of beneficiaries is, almost
by definition, more costly to the employer, and thus, regulators
seeking to enact more protective legislation will face a
countervailing threat from employers, namely that employers
will refuse to provide benefits if they are regulated too strictly.110
Not only is the threat credible—because employers exist to sell
goods and services, not to serve as a platform for benefit
distribution—but it becomes more credible as the unregulated
market worsens.
Consider ERISA and health insurance. Insurance markets
are different than regular service markets. Insurance is a risk
contract, and to properly price a risk contract the insurer must
accurately assess the probability and size of expected payouts for
a given insured person.111 However, asymmetric information
and adverse selection make this process difficult. First, there is
often a difference between the true risk an insured person poses
and the risk the insurer can ascertain based on the insured’s
observable qualities.112 Second, the people most likely to seek
health insurance are those who have a higher probability of
needing it.113 In such circumstances, the chance that an insurer
will underprice policies is high, which leads either to the insurer
not offering policies in the future or raising prices. Raising
prices, however, drives away the better risks, for whom a higher
premium is not justified, and makes the insurer’s pool
smaller.114 The ultimate consequence could be no insurance

109. Cf. Paul M. Secunda & Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH.
U. L. REV. 733, 754 (2016) (making the argument in the pension setting).
110. Id.
111. Ari Mwachofi & Assaf F. Al-Assaf, Health Care Market Deviations from the
Ideal Market, 11 SQU MED. J. 328 (2011).
112. Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L. J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004) (explaining asymmetric information in
insurance markets). As Siegelman’s famous article points out, however, sometimes
informational asymmetries and information processing disparities can help insurers,
in the form of “propitious selection.” Id. at 1226.
113. Id. at 1226 n. 9 (citing EEOC: Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to
Health Insurance, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 724, at 405:7121 (June 8, 1993), which
defines adverse selection as the “tendency of people who represent poorer-thanaverage health risks to apply for and/or retain health insurance to a greater extent
than people who represent average or above average health risks.”).
114. Siegelman, supra note 112, at 1254.
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market at all—the “death spiral”115—or one in which affordable
policies are offered to only a small number of people who are
clearly good risks.116
Compared to individual policies, group policies fare much
better.117 Insurance offered through the workplace—in which
the insurable unit is the group—is a means to provide insurance
to group members who, on their own, would be unable to obtain
affordable insurance.118 Thus, in the United States, unless one
is poor (Medicaid) or elderly (Medicare), employment benefits
insurance is essentially the only way to reliably obtain health
insurance.119 The reality is that employers, regulators, and
judges are aware this problem. Correspondingly, legal rules,
such as those that protect employees or beneficiaries, that make
it more costly or burdensome for employers to offer health
insurance put regulators and judges in a bind.120 Strong rules
that lead to employers dropping health insurance could result in
many employees being unable to obtain insurance at all.121
Therefore, I predict that legal rules concerning employment
benefits health insurance would be particularly solicitous to
employers. Consequently, under ERISA, they have been.
B. Opacity
Another problem with employment benefits systems is the
confusion about who is paying for what, and who deserves
socially desirable goods.122 First, as economists have long
explained, employees in the form of foregone wages pay for
benefits.123 An employer who provides benefits is not paying for
them out of his own pocket as a gratuity; the employer is offering
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1236 (explaining how “normal theoretical conclusions about the
optimality—and even the existence—of a competitive market equilibrium can fail in
the presence of asymmetric information.”). See also Jonathan Gruber, Covering the
Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 574-77 (2008)
(describing flaws in individual markets).
117. “Adverse selection risks decline to the extent an insurer can insure a group
bound together by some commonality other than an interest in obtaining health
insurance—for example, the same employer, the same geographical region, or the
same church.” Maher, supra note 66, at 1770.
118. Id. at 1767-68.
119. Gruber, supra note 116, at 573.
120. Secunda & Maher supra note 109, at 754.
121. Id.
122. See REBA, supra note 98, at 1305-07.
123. Id. at 1306.
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them as non-wage compensation, in return for labor.124 Yet the
public often appears to believe benefits are paid for by the
employer and gifted to the employee. This sort of confusion
makes honest reform discussions very difficult. Second, the
nation relies so heavily on employment benefits systems that it
may have led some to believe that an individual only deserves
health insurance if that individual has a job that offers it. While
that is not true—as readily apparent once the assumption is
examined—to the extent that employment benefits approaches
spread soft moral indictments like the foregoing, that is a reason
to be concerned about their use.
I do not think that the problems of fragility and opacity are
ones that receive sufficient attention when considering
employment benefits systems.125 Others, such as the fact that
employment benefits systems do not reach the unemployed126 or
are subject to employer manipulation,127 receive more attention.
That is not to say fragility and opacity are more concerning than
all other employment benefits problems, but merely that in the
normal course they are often not considered to be problems
worthy of discussion at all. Perhaps, in the myopic nature of
many scholars, I cannot help but see a commonality in Roberts
and Leonards’ work.
We can all agree that certain types of discrimination—such
as discrimination based on race or disability—are particularly
pernicious and must be dealt with first. It may very well be that
some health statuses intersect with other protected classes with
sufficient frequency that people with those health statuses are
protected against discrimination. But—even assuming that is
true, and it does not seem to be, it still seems like something is
being overlooked. Discriminating against those with a certain
health status, even if there is no overlap with another already
protected characteristic or class, can have undesirable
consequences that, like fragility and opacity in employment
benefits systems, observers often discount or ignore. At a
124. Id.
125. One way to avoid both problems is to cut employers out of the picture and
simply regulate the relationship between consumers and the providers of a given
socially desirable good. Directly regulating the provider is in effect, is what the
ACA’s exchanges do: the socially desirable good, health insurance, is sold in a
regulated, subsidized market, which includes regulations not just about the content
of the good, but also regulations that make the purchase of such goods intelligible to
regular consumers. See generally id. at 1316-19.
126. Id. at 1320.
127. Id. at 1313.
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minimum, permitting discrimination on health status leads to
social stigmatization that, merely by the operation of
subconscious bias, could result in an individual’s indisputably
good qualities—such as being diligent and capable at their
jobs—being overlooked. Admittedly, legal rules that prohibit
discrimination may impose high costs that encourage us to
forego the laws and risk stigmatizing groups of people.
However, that argument is weakened if carefully-crafted legal
rules can easily avoid the undesirable consequences stemming
from laws that prohibit discrimination based on health status.128
To be sure, I do not claim a necessary connection between
the flaws of employment benefits systems and healthism, and I
realize that much scholarly work adduces previously
unrecognized shortcomings in our thinking. That said, in this
commentary I am not only sharing general thoughts on Roberts
and Leonards’ book, but I am sharing thoughts that reading
their work prompted me, an employee benefits theorist,129 to
have.
It is with great interest that I look forward to the
publication of Healthism, and to Roberts and Leonards’
continuing work on the subject.

128. For example, with respect to smoking, Roberts and Weeks acknowledge the
possibility that smokers might have higher rates of absenteeism or other undesirable
job performance effects. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 898. But they point out that
such evidence is mixed, and that discriminating against smokers in the job
market could have larger effects society deems undesirable, including reducing the
likelihood that smokers will get access to the care they need, and disparately
disfavoring historically disadvantaged groups. Id. Legal rules that can reduce the
incidence of nicotine use without those negatives are more attractive and worthy of
scholarly attention.
129. I prefer to describe myself as an “employee benefits theorist.” Many of my
colleagues prefer to describe me as an “employee benefits nerd.” But I am assured
they do so out of love, which is why I send them, as a holiday gift, whatever
scholarship on employee benefits I have completed in the previous year.

